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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, an increasing source of liability for large and small
businesses has resulted from employment discrimination lawsuits brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' ("Title VII"), the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), and the Americans with
Disabilities Acte ("ADA"). These federal laws expanded employee rights
in the workplace by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability. As a consequence, these
statutes sparked a remarkable growth in employment practices-related
litigation, much of which centers around establishing the boundaries of
liability.
The issue concerning who may be subject to liability under the antidiscrimination statutes often focuses on how the statutes define the term
"employer." The three statutes contain virtually identical definitions of
the term.' As will be explained below, the overwhelming position taken
in the federal circuit courts is that under these statutory definitions of
"employer" it is the corporate employers, and not individuals, who are
subject to liability under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA.5
The dramatic increase in employment discrimination litigation and
the potential losses associated with such lawsuits threatened many
corporations. As a result, many companies turned to directors' and
officers' ("D&O") insurance policies as a way to protect their assets in
the event of an employment discrimination lawsuit.
Although D&O insurance was developed to shield the personal
assets of directors and officers from liability, it serves a dual purpose.
The D&O policy has two distinct insuring clauses. The first clause
insures the directors and officers for their personal liability. The second
clause insures the corporation for amounts that it is lawfully permitted or
required to expend in indemnifying directors and officers for their
liability. In other words, where a director or officer and a corporation are
each named in an employment discrimination lawsuit and the director or
officer is found liable, the corporation will most likely have to indemnify
the director or officer for their personal loss. The D&O policy then

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
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allows the corporation to be reimbursed to the extent of the indemnification.
Many companies realized the potential of D&O insurance to provide
protection against corporate liability in employment practices claims.
D&O insurance carriers responded by marketing an employment practices
liability insurance ("EPLr') endorsement to the standard D&O policy. As
a result, many companies purchased D&O liability insurance, mistakenly
believing that the EPLI endorsement would provide the necessary
protection against employment practices liability.
Due to recent legal developments regarding the interpretation of the
three federal anti-discrimination statutes, the effectiveness of the D&O
insurance policy, with or without the EPLI endorsement, has been
drastically undermined. In a situation where a director or officer and the
corporation are named in an employment practices-related lawsuit, the
D&O policy, while reimbursing the corporation to the extent that it
indemnifies its directors and officers, will not cover the liability allocated
solely to the corporation. If the directors and officers are not subject to
individual liability (as the circuit courts are holding), the reimbursement
clause of the D&O policy is not triggered and the policy will not provide
any corporate protection. Rather, companies should opt for the standalone EPLI policy in order to protect themselves from the mounting level
of employment discrimination litigation.
This Note will demonstrate how the circuit courts' interpretation of
the statutory definition of "employer" has rendered the D&O insurance
policy, with or without the EPLI endorsement, ineffective in protecting
corporations facing an employment discrimination lawsuit. Part II of this
Note provides background information with regard to D&O liability
insurance. Part III details the dramatic increase in employment-related
litigation over the past several years and the factors which caused this
remarkable growth. Part IV briefly outlines the different categories of
wrongful employment practices. Part V begins by discussing the three
federal anti-discrimination statutes and how they have become a
significant factor in the widespread emergence of employment practices
litigation. Part VI is an analysis of how various circuit courts held that
there is no individual liability under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA.
These courts have interpreted the agent provision in the "employer"
definitions as not providing for individual liability, but rather, established
respondeat superior liability on the employer based on agency principles.
Part VII concludes that if directors and officers will not be subject to
liability in their individual capacities under the anti-discrimination
statutes, D&O insurance, with or without the EPLI endorsement, will fail
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to provide coverage to corporations against employment practices liability
claims brought under these federal statutes.
II. DIRECToRS' AND OFFIcERs' LIABILITY INSURANCE
A.

Introduction

Serving on the board of directors of a corporation is generally
considered to be a prestigious and rewarding experience. However, it is
also saddled with the potential for crippling personal liability. A board

member or executive officer may be subject to liability if they breach
their fiduciary duties of care or loyalty by failing to act in the best
interests of the corporation or its shareholders.' In light of this possibility, a director or officer will want to take precautions to ensure that his
personal assets are not at risk.
First, he should take every measure to ensure that the corporation
provides the broadest indemnification provision possible. Generally, a
corporation will institute the broadest indemnification provisions within
its bylaws allowing it to bear the financial burden of a lawsuit brought
against the directors and officers! All fifty states have statutorily
authorized corporations to protect directors and officers from personal
liability through indemnification. 9 Furthermore, most of these state
indemnification statutes expressly empower corporations to purchase and

maintain D&O liability insurance.'0 Second, a corporate director or
officer may protect his or her personal assets by making sure that the
corporation he is serving purchases the statutorily permissible amount of
D&O liability insurance."

6. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 234-235 (3d
ed. 1983).
7. See Michael Cavallaro, Directors'and Officers' Liability-Whatto Know, From a Broker's
Perspective, 28TH WATSON ,VYATr DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS SYMPOSIUM see. 7, at 1 (1996)
[hereinafter D&O SYmposiuM].
8. See id.
9. See id. For a summary of the state indemnification statutes, see VILLIAM E. KNEPPER &
DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 831-33 (4th ed. 1988);
Bennett L. Ross, Note, Protecting Corporate Directors and Officers: Insurance and Other
Alternatives, 40 VAND. L. REV. 775, 783 nA8 (1987).
10. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 9, at 688; Ross, supra note 9, at 783-84.
11. See Cavallaro, supra note 7, at 1. Indeed, businesses are being urged to consider the EPLI
policy as a measure ofprotection against the growing number of lawsuits brought by employees. See
Marcia Coyle, Employers Under Siege Get Coverage, NAT'L L.., Dec. 8, 1997, at BI (noting that
"more than 60 companies now offer some variation of it--in the form ofstand-alone policies, as part
of larger general liability contracts, or as an endorsement to directors' and officers' liability
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B. Background
In 1934, Lloyds of London drafted the first D&O liability policies
for two large publicly held companies, Flintkote Corporation and
Federated Department Stores. 2 The promulgation of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 compelled the
directors and officers of these corporations to acquire an insurance policy

that would protect them from liability if they violated these securities
laws. 3 However, it was approximately thirty years before D&O liability
insurance developed
into the widespread type of insurance coverage that
4
today.
is
it
In the mid-1970s, the market for D&O liability insurance first began
to blossom due to the rise in litigation precipitated by the 1974-1975
recession." '"Up until that time, there was very little, if any, demand for

D&O liability insurance as suits against directors and officers were
relatively rare and only sporadically successful."' 6 It was not until the
mid-1980s that corporations perceived the importance of D&O liability
17
insurance in the nation's economy.
During this period, directors and officers faced an increase in the

bases for the imposition of liability.8 The development of government

insurance"). This Note will examine the need for businesses to ensure that the EPLI policy purchased
offers the maximum protection for the corporate entity as well as its directors and officers.
12. See Cavallaro, supra note 7, at 2.
13. See i.
14. See i.
15. See Dan L. Goldwasser, Directors'andOfficers' LiabilityInsurance1994, in DIRECTORS'
AND OICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE 1994, at 11, 11 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. A4-4449, 1994).
16. Id. at 11-12.
17. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 9, at 685. During the D&O insurance crisis of the
mid-to-late 1980s, "[piremiums skyrocketed, deductibles increased at an extraordinary rate, and
coverage shrank. At the same time, policy durations became shorter and shorter, and policies
themselves included an increasing number of exclusions." Dennis J.Block et al., Indemniflcationand
Insuranceof CorporateOfficials, in DIRECTORS' AND OFfiCERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE 1991, at 9,
13 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4341,1991) [hereinafter D&O
1991]; see also Paul H. Dawes & Patrick K. Shannon, Cost Allocation and Timing of Payment
Issues, in D&O 1991, supra, at 333, 336 (stating that insurance carriers responded by reducing the
extent of policy coverage while simultaneously raising premium costs); Ross, supra note 9, at 776
(stating that even corporations that could purchase D&O insurance or renew existing coverage had
to pay significantly higher premiums for policies that were shorter in duration and included a host
of new exclusions, while accepting lower limits of liability coverage and increased deductibles).
18. See Dawes & Shannon, supranote 17, at 335. These bases included claims in the wrongful
termination context, in the breach of contract area, and "in the securities law arena under Rule lOb-5
and breach of fiduciary duties in the context of merger and acquisitions activity, including hostile
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regulations in the areas of securities and antitrust law, combined with the
greater utilization of derivative and class action suits, also resulted in a
dramatic increase of exposure to liability for directors and officers. 9
Without adequate insurance to protect their personal assets, there was a
"serious threat of mass defections from corporate boardrooms."2 In fact,
this fear of uninsured liability led many corporate executives either to
resign from their positions or to refuse to serve on a board in the first
instance.2 1
In an attempt to alleviate these concerns and attract and retain
competent directors and officers, many corporations began to offer these
individuals protection from personal liability.' The traditional method
of protection was corporate indemnification, which was permissible under
state statutes& However, in this crisis climate, it became apparent that
corporate indemnification would not provide adequate financial protection
for directors and officers.' As a result, corporations began to purchase
D&O liability insurance in order to protect directors and officers from
claims that exceeded the scope of their current indemnification.' At this

takeover
19.
20.
21.

attempts and management-led leveraged buyouts." Id. (citation omitted).
See Ross, supra note 9, at 775-76.
KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 9, at 685.
See Block et al., supra note 17, at 13. As Business Week observed in a 1986 cover story:
Concerned about increasing legal hassles and time demands, scores of directors
are quietly stepping down. Some prominent executives confide that when their current
terms expire, they will not stand for reelection to outside boards. Many more are turning
away all invitations to serve. A number of troubled companies, which need strong
directors, are facing mass defections ....

[All of this] comes just as many boards face a rash of proposals for
(..
takeovers, divestitures, stock repurchases, and management buyouts that cry out for
scrutiny by strong outside directors.
Laurie Baum, The Job Nobody Wants: Outside Directors Find That the Risks and Hassles Just
Aren't Worth It, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56. Furthermore, this situation had become so
precarious for corporate executives that it prompted a Harvard Business School professor to explain
that being the director of a company is an "unattractive if not outright dangerous proposition."
William A. Sahlman, Why Sane People Shouldn'tServe on PublicBoards, HAiv. Bus. REv., MayJune 1990, at 28.
22. See Ross, supra note 9, at 776.
23. See id.
24. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 9, at 686.
25. See Ross, supra note 9, at 785. The types of claims that are beyond the scope of
indemnification but are covered by D&O insurance arise most frequently in the context of derivative
and securities lawsuits. See id. When a derivative lawsuit is initiated, directors and officers cannot
be indemnified for judgments or amounts paid in settlement but can be indemnified for expenses.
See id A D&O policy, on the other hand, will generally cover judgments and amounts paid in the
settlement of a derivative action. See id. at 785-86. Secondly, the Securities and Exchange
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juncture, D&O liability insurance changed from functioning as a minor
coverage demanding small premiums to an important and costly issue for

corporations.'
C.

Two Coverages Within One Policy

The typical D&O liability insurance policy provides two distinct
coverages within one policy.' The first coverage, referred to as the
D&O individual liability coverage, insures the individual directors and
officers when they are not indemnified by the corporation.28 The second
coverage, known as the corporate reimbursement form, reimburses the
corporation for amounts that it is lawfully permitted or required to
expend in indemnifying its directors and officers. 9 Based on these two
insuring clauses, "[t]he corporation is not insured directly for its own
liability or defense but is only insured to the extent it indemnifies its
directors or officers."3' Therefore, "[d]irectors' and officers' liability
insurance policies cover directors and officers exclusively and provide no

Commission is of the opinion that indemnification for violations of the federal securities laws is
against public policy and, therefore, unenforceable. See id at 786. However, "[blecause the SEC
does not consider insurance for these violations unlawful per se, D&O coverage offers important
protections against liability arising under the federal securities laws." Id (footnotes omitted).
D&O insurance is also effective in situations where a corporation is allowed to indemnify
its directors and officers but cannot or will not do so. See id. For example, a corporation cannot
indemnify in certain circumstances such as insolvency or bankruptcy. See id. In addition, a
corporation may be unwilling to indenify a director after a management change or in the aftermath
of a hostile takeover. See id.
26. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 9, at 685. One commentator notes that other
commentators have claimed that the importance of D&O insurance coverage is overstated. See Ross,
supra note 9, at 787. However, this argument ignores the fact that D&O insurance coverage is
needed to attract and maintain qualified executives to serve as directors and officers. See id.
Furthermore, D&O liability insurance is necessary to provide corporate insiders with enough
protection so that the fear of liability will not hinder or affect their business judgments. See id
27. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 9, at 687; Barry W. Lee & Andrew L. Dudnick,
Directors' and Ojicers' Liability Insurance: Policy Exclusions, in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS'

LIABILrrY INSURANCE 1988, at 487,490 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. A4-4223, 1988); Ross, supra note 9, at 783.
28. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 9, at 687; Lee & Dudnick, supra note 27, at 490;
Ross, supra note 9, at 783.
29. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 9, at 687; Lee & Dudnick, supra note 27, at 491;
Ross, supra note 9, at 783.
30. Joseph P. Monteleone, Coverage Issues Under Commercial General Liability and
Directors' and Officers' Liability Policies, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 47, 64 (1996).
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for defense expenses or liability allocable to the corporation
coverage
31
itself."

mn'.

EMPLOYMENT-RELATED LIABiLITY ON THE RISE

Employment-related litigation increased dramatically over the past
several years.3 2 Lawsuits initiated by employees and former employees

against their employers are reportedly one of the "'fastest growing areas
of litigation across the country.' 33 Although there are several factors
accounting for this remarkable growth in employment practices-related
litigation, by far the most important are the federal laws which expanded
employees' rights in the workplace and provided new remedies based
upon new causes of action.' The four federal laws are Title VII,3" the

31. Dawes & Shannon, supra note 17, at 339. A related topic, allocation of loss between
directors and officers and the corporation, is one of the most controversial issues in D&O liability
insurance today. As stated, a D&O insurance policy will only cover claims brought against directors
and officers in their individual capacity, not claims initiated against the corporation alone. However,
the issue of allocation arises whenever a lawsuit is brought against the directors and officers of a
corporation and the corporation itself. See D&O Liability Survey Report, 1995 WATSON WYATr
DiREcToRs AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY 46 (1995); Allocation in Directors' and Officers'
Liability Insurance: A Commentary on the Law's Evolution and a Summary of the Case Law, in
D&O SYIpOsulm, supra note 7, see. 10, at I (prepared by Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman &
Dicker).
32. See Jay Finnegan, Law and Disorder,INC., Apr. 1994, at 64, 64; Evelyn Gilbert,
Employment PracticesLiabilityMk. Developing,NAT'L UNDERWRITR, Jan. 16, 1995, at 9, 9; Stan
Zolna, Businesses Lookfor Coverfrom Employee Suits, NAT'L UNDERWRUTER, Feb. 12, 1996, at 9,
40.
33. Robert A. Machson & Joseph P. Monteleone, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful
Employment Practices Claims Under VariousLiability Policies, 49 Bus. LAW. 689, 689 (quoting
Chrys A. Martin, Coveragefor Claims Arising Out of Employment, FOR THE DEF., Sept. 1989, at
25, 25). In fact, the number of employment discrimination suits and complaints rose by
approximately 2,200% over the past two decades. See Finnegan, supra note 32, at 64; see also
Michael Schachner, Suits Send Employers Runningfor Cover, BUS. INS., Nov. 21, 1994, at 57, 57
(2,166%). In 1973, only 1,787 lawsuits were brought as opposed to 5,931 in 1977. See Gilbert,supra
note 32, at 9. In 1990, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission received 62,135 complaints,
a number which climbed to 90,000 by the end of 1994. See Julianna Ryan, InsurancePolicies That
May Be Calledon to Respond to Employment-Related Claims, in D&O SYMPOSIUM, supra note 7,
at 315; Gilbert, supra note 32, at 9; Zolna, supra note 32, at 40. These figures represent only those
persons making claims under federal anti-discrimination employment statutes. See Ryan, supra, at
315. "Employment cases brought in federal courts averaged between 5000 and 6000 cases a year
from 1976 to 1980, but have increased since 1980 to an average of over 8000 annually during 19881991, rising to 10,771 in 1992." Machson & Monteleone, supra, at 690. In sum, employment
discrimination lawsuits now account for an estimated one-fifth of all civil suits filed in U.S. courts.
See Finnegan, supra note 32, at 64.
34. See Finnegan, supranote 32, at 66. Other factors, in addition to federal legislation, include
the stagnant economy in the early 1990's and the resulting layoffs, see Victoria Sonshine Pasher,
Employment-Related Liability Claims on the Rise, NAT'L UNDERWlriER, Nov. 27, 1995, at 25, 25,
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ADEA, 36 the ADA, 37 and the Civil Rights Act of 199138 ("1991 Act")
which permitted the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages
under Title VII.39 The costs incurred in defending these claims can be
overwhelming and the settlements or judgments awarded to the plaintiffs
can cripple a small business. In addition, the lawsuits can last for a
period of years and demand considerable time and energy from
management.4 Over the next decade, as the work force grows more
diverse, it would be prudent for most companies to assume that they will
face a minimum of one, and most likely several, employment practices
lawsuits.42 In anticipation, companies have been looking for ways to
protect their assets in the event of such a lawsuit.'
Employment practices claims are often brought against directors and
officers as well as the corporation. Officers are usually responsible for
the day-to-day operations of a company's business, such as making

the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine, see id., and the extensive media attention to events
with a sexual harassment theme, including the Clarence Thomas Supreme Court confirmation
hearings in the Fall of 1991, see Monteleone, supra note 30, at 47; Gilbert, supra note 32, at 9;
Pasher, supra, at 25.
The employment-at-will doctrine, at one time, recognized by most states, was once a
cornerstone of the free enterprise philosophy. See Finnegan, supra note 32, at 66. The doctrine
allowed an employer to "fire someone for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all-so long
as the firing [was not] discriminatory or [did not] violate a collective bargaining agreement." Id. "By
1989, however, courts in 45 states had accepted several theories that eroded the 'at will' rule, giving
rise to claims for wrongful termination." Id.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in the workplace on the basis of race,
religion, sex, or national origin).
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) (protecting workers who are 40 years of age or older).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (making it illegal to discriminate against employees who
are disabled, including the obese).
According to Cheryl Blackwell Bryson, the head of the employment practices group at the
law firm of Rivkin, Radler & Kremer in Chicago, "[t]he Americans with Disabilities Act, under
which about 43 million Americans qualify for protection, has been the single largest headache for
employers ... " Schachner, supra note 33, at 57. Furthermore, "[tlhrough 1993, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission has fielded approximately 87,000 ADA-related complaints,
about 50% of which were for discriminatory termination. Now that number is approaching 100,000."
Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
39. See Finnegan, supranote 32, at 66; see also Coyle, supra note 11, at B2 (noting that the
1991 Act "exposed employers to compensatory and punitive damages ... [and] more important,...
put the claims before juries").
40. See Finnegan, supra note 32, at 66.
41. Seekd.
42. See Zolna, supra note 32, at 40.
43. According to Cheryl Blackwell Bryson, head of the employment practices group at the law
firm of Rivkin, Radler & Kremer in Chicago, "[c]ompanies are now beginning to think about how
they can avoid liability." Schachner, supra note 33, at 57.
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hiring and firing decisions." In addition, officers usually work in close
proximity to the employees, thereby exposing officers to potential sexual
harassment claims.45 Similarly, but with less frequency, directors of
corporations are named in employment discrimination suits, especially in
small corporations where they are involved in the daily operations of the
business.' In fact, a 1995 study revealed that one out of every four
D&O liability claims were brought by employees in employment
practices-related lawsuits.47
Since employment practices claims often name directors and officers
and because one of the primary functions of the D&O policy is to
reimburse the corporation to the extent that it indemnifies its directors
and officers for their liability, corporations began to look to D&O
insurance carriers to protect their corporate assets. D&O insurance
carriers seized this opportunity by marketing an EPLI endorsement to the
standard D&O policy.'
The EPLI enhancement to the D&O policy gives many companies
the incentive to purchase D&O insurance by extending coverage to all
employees of a corporation as well as to its directors and officers.49
However, like the standard D&O policy, it does not extend coverage to
the corporate entity for employment practices claims." Companies that
already have, or are considering a D&O policy, with or without an EPLI
endorsement, should beware. Due to recent legal developments regarding
the interpretation of the definition of employer in the three federal antidiscrimination statutes-Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA--the
effectiveness of the D&O insurance policy in covering employment
practices claims, with or without the EPLI endorsement, has been
drastically undermined.

44. See Machson & Monteleone, supra note 33, at 710; Monteleone, supra note 30, at 62.
45. See Machson & Monteleone, supra note 33, at 710; Monteleone, supra note 30, at 62.
46. See Curcio v. Chinn Enters., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 190 (N.D. 11. 1995).
47. See When Pigs Fly!, VIEWpoiNT, Apr. 1996, at 1, 2. The 1995 NWyatt Study "reported that
one quarter of all claims against directors and officers were brought by employees, with the average
paid employee claim exceeding $247,000, excluding defense costs." Friendor Foe?, VIEWPOINT,
Apr. 1996, at 8, 8.
48. See Machson & Monteleone, supra note 33, at 711; Ryan, supra note 33, at 320;
Schachner, supra note 33, at 58.
49. See Cavallaro, supra note 7, at 39; Machson & Monteleone, supra note 33, at 712.
50. See Cavallaro,supra note 7, at 39; Machson & Monteleone, supra note 33, at 712. This
distinction becomes especially noteworthy when analyzing the corporation's potential exposure in
employment litigation. See Coyle, supranote 11, at B2 (noting that the number of sexual harassment
lawsuits more than doubled between 1990 and 1995 and the compensatory award for a wrongful

termination claim increased by 45 percent).
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IV. WRONGFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
The three most common types of employment practices claims are
wrongful termination, discrimination, and sexual harassment."1 The first
category of claims, known as wrongful termination claims, usually arises
in the context of a firing or layoff.52 The terminated employee claims
that the discharge violated a statutory right because it was based on
factors such as race, sex, disability, or age. 3 Also included in this
category are "constructive discharge suits" that occur when an employee
is not fired, but where the employer made the work environment so
unbearable that the employee was effectively forced to resign to protect
his or her financial, physical, and emotional well-being. 4
The second category of claims, commonly referred to as discrimination claims, cover a wide variety of acts that may or may not result in
the termination of employment." These acts include the failure to hire
a job applicant, failure to promote an employee, demotion of an
employee, creation of a work environment wrought with ethnic, racial,
or religious discrimination, or employment-related defamation based on
one or more of these characteristics.56 There are two types of discrimination claims: disparate treatment claims and disparate impact claims.7
In a disparate treatment case, an employee must establish that he or she
was treated differently by the employer, based on his or her gender, race,
or age. 8 In a disparate impact case, the employee must prove that the
employer's policies adversely impacted a particular group.59
The third category of claims, sexual harassment claims, are a
distinct form of gender-based discrimination.6"
Sexual harassment generally has come to mean unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of an inappropriate sexual nature when:

51. See Machson & Monteleone, supra note 33, at 690. This does not include labormanagement issues that may arise in the context of collective bargaining agreements and laws related
to them. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See i& at 691.
55. See id.
56. See a
57. See id. at 692.
58. Seek
59. See id.
60. See id.
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1. submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term and condition of an individual's employment; or
2. employment decisions affecting an individual are made based
upon submission to such conduct; or
3. the conduct unreasonably interferes with an individual's work
performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or otherwise offensive
work environment (hostile work environment sexual harassment). 6

Courts have referred to the first two categories as "quid pro quo"
harassment and have termed the third category "'as hostile or abusive
work environment"' harassment.62 Throughout this Note, the Author
refers collectively to all three categories of claims as wrongful employment practices.

V. TITLE VII, ADEA, ADA, AND THE 1991 AcT
The widespread emergence of employment practices litigation is due
largely to the enactment and existence of federal anti-discrimination
statutes: Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the 1991 Act.63 These
statutes have provided employees with an extensive arsenal to initiate
lawsuits against employers in order to combat workplace discrimination.
At one time, discrimination in employment was a societal norm.6
African-Americans and ethnic minorities were relatively nonexistent in
professional or semi-professional fields.65 Female employees were paid
considerably less than male employees' and were subject to harassment
by their male supervisors, often without legal recourse.67 Similarly, aged
and disabled employees were not considered productive and competent

61. Id. at 693.
62. Id.
63. Due to the fact that employment discrimination is a purely statutory cause of action and
is not based on common law, employment practices claims are brought under these federal statutes,
See Phillip L. Lamberson, Comment, PersonalLiabilityfor Violations of Title VII: Thirty Years of
Indecision, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 419, 426 (1994). However, it must be noted that there are state laws
which mirror these federal anti-discrimination statutes and can be used as the basis of state
employment discrimination claims.
64. See Steven K. Sanborn, Note, Employment Discrimination-Miller v. Maxwell's
International, Inc.: Individual Liabilityfor Supervisory Employees Under Title VI1 and the ADEA,
17 W. NEV ENG. L. REV. 143, 145 (1995).
65. See id.
66. See Sanborn, supra note 64, at 145. It was estimated that full-time female employees
earned only 61 percent of the income of male employees in the same category in 1960; this figure
decreased to 57 percent by 1974. See JOAN ABRAMSON, OLD Boys-NEW WOMEN: THE POLITICS OF
SEx DiSCRMINATION 80 (1979).
67. See Sanborn, supra note 64, at 145.
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members of the working world.6" It was not until the New Deal
legislation of the 1930s that the first steps were taken to regulate
employment practices.' 9 However, the major breakthrough did not come

about until Congress passed Title VII.70

The purpose of Title VII, clearly the focal point of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,71 was to protect employees from discrimination in the
workplace based on race, color, religion, sex,72 or national origin.'I
Age, due to its distinctive nature, was not included by Congress as a
7 However, Congress did request
protected characteristic under Title VII. M
that the Secretary of Labor create a report addressing age discrimination
in employment. 75 This report eventually led to the enactment of the
ADEA in 1967.76

68. See id. at 145-46.
69. See id. at 146.
70. President Kennedy proposed a civil rights bill in the wake of the Birmingham uprising of
May, 1963, which ultimately became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at 147.
71. See id.
72. Originally, Congress did not include "sex!' as one of the protected categories in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
Many members of Congress believed that the nature of sex discrimination required its
own legislation. These congressmen feared that including sex in the Civil Rights Act
would make the Act too controversial, threatening the entire cause. Nevertheless, at the
time the amendment was introduced, the bill already had enough support to withstand the
incorporation of gender protections. Over time, the protections against sexual discrimination have indeed strengthened the Act.
Id. at 148 (footnotes omitted).
73. Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1994).
74. See Sanborn, supra note 64, at 149.
75. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN

EMPLOYhmT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965).
76. See Sanborn, supra note 64, at 150. The ADEA provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
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A third source of wrongful employment practices litigation
manifested when Congress enacted the ADA. The ADA attempted to
eradicate discrimination against individuals based on their disabilities.7 7
Congress provided another means of legal recourse for employees
by passing the 1991 Act, which expanded the scope of remedies available
under Title VII. "Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Title VII provided only the equitable remedies of injunctive relief,
reinstatement and back pay for the victims of employment discrimination."79 The 1991 Act broadened Title VII relief to include the legal
remedies of compensatory and punitive damages." However, Congress
placed limitations on these remedies by scaling the amount of damages

affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age;
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994). "Specifically, the ADEA prohibits arbitrary age discrimination against
any employee over forty." Christopher Greer, "Nho,-Me?": A Supervisor's IndividualLiabilityfor
Discrimination in the Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1835, 1838 (1994); see also Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978) ("The ADEA broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the
workplace based on age.").

77. The ADA provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge ofemployees, employee compensation,

job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(1994).
78. See Machson & Monteleone, supra note 33, at 695; Michael D. Moberly & Linda H.
Miles, The Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on Individual Title VI Liability, 18 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REv. 475, 476 (1993); Ming K. Ayvas, Note, The Circuit Split on Title VII Personal
SupervisorLiability,23 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 797, 800 (1996); Kristi Lappe, Comment, "I Just Work
Here":PrecludingSupervisors' IndividualLiability Under the FederalAntidiscriminationStatutes
and the Arizona Civil Rights Act, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1301, 1303-04 (1995).
After Title VII was criticized for failing to provide adequate remedies for
plaintiffs, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1990. President George Bush vetoed
the Act, labeling it a quota bill. When Congress failed to override the veto, the bill was
defeated. Just three months after President Bush's veto, however, concern over Title VII's
inadequacies resurfaced and the Act was revived in 1991. On November 21, 1992, after
much political maneuvering and heated debate, President Bush signed the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.
Joseph J. Manna, PersonalLiability Underthe Civil Rights Act of1991: Piercingthe CorporateVeil,
4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 339, 341-42 (1995) (footnotes omitted); see also supra note 39.
79. Kathleen Dawson, Note, Supervisor Liability for Employment Discrimination Under
FederalLaw: Substantive Remedy or ProceduralIssue?, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1875, 1883 (1995)
(footnotes omitted); see also Manna, supra note 78, at 342 (stating that even though Title VII did
not permit compensatory or punitive damages "no matter how egregious the circumstances; it did
allow employers to avoid meaningful liability"); Ayvas, supranote 78, at 801 (stating that Title VII
remedies, reinstatement and back-pay, were generally assessed against the employer).
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(a)(1) (1994) (authorizing compensatory and punitive damage
awards, but only in cases of "unlawful intentional discrimination!).
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available according to the size of the offending individual's employer."1
The scope of liability under the statutes, however, has been subject

to extensive judicial scrutiny in the federal circuit courts. Much of the
controversy surrounding who may be subject to liability under the anti-

discrimination statutes revolves around the statutes' definitions of

"employer. ' 832 Title VII defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees...

and any agent of such a person."83 Both the ADEA and the ADA mirror
Title VII in their definitions." Thus, the question became whether these

definitions impose liability on individuals unlawfully discriminating
against an employee based on the "and any agent" provision. Since the

See id. § 1981a(b)(3). The section reads:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section...
and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section, or shall not exceed, for
each complaining party(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees... $50,000;
(3) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201
employees... $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees... $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees ... $300,000.

81.

Id.
82. See Kendra Samson, Note, Does Title VII Allow for Liability Against Individual
Defendants?, 84 KY. LU. 1303, 1305 (1995-1996).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that "the
term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
Id.
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person ....
84. The ADEA of 1967 provides:
The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year: Provided, That prior to June
30, 1968, employers having fewer than fifty employees shall not be considered
employers. The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or
political subdivision ofa State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political
subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency, but such term does not include the
United States, or a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994). The ADA of 1990 provides:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person, except
that, for two years following the effective date of this subchapter, an employer means a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more employees for
each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year,
and any agent of such person.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994).
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statutes define "employer" similarly, courts have used the same analysis

for all three statutes, routinely addressing arguments dealing with
individual liability to each of the statutes."5
The issue of whether there is individual liability under Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA is a matter of statutory construction. The legislative
histories of these statutes fail to provide clear guidance of Congressional
intent and, therefore, shed very little light on this problem.86 Nevertheless, courts have interpreted the "employer" definitions of the statutes in

basically two ways. 7 First, some courts have imposed liability on
individuals based on the plain meaning of the statutory language.88 In
doing so, they have reasoned that the "and any agent" provision subjects

both the employer entity and the individuals who participated in the
discrimination to liability. Second, some courts have decided that the

agent provision simply establishes respondeat superior liability on the
employer based on agency principles." Literally meaning "[1]et the
master answer,"" respondeat superior liability imputes liability to

85. See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-80 (7th Cir. 1995)
(stating that courts routinely apply arguments regarding individual liability to all three statutes
interchangeably).
86. One student commentator highlighted the problem with relying on legislative history to
determine whether Congress intended supervisor liability:
While congressional intent is at most a tenuous argument of last resort, it is even
more tenuous in the context of Title VII. The legislative history of the 1964 Act is
scattered throughout the Congressional Record. There was only one official committee
report which addressed Title VII. The issue of supervisor liability was not discussed in
either the committee report or during floor debates. Even a cursory review of the Title
VII debates in the House and Senate reveals the often hostile attitude toward the proposed
legislation. It is difficult to accept that if supervisor liability had been intended, it would
not have been discussed once. Rather, it is likely that it would not only have been
discussed, but would have been a wellspring of vehement opposition.
Clara J. Montanari, Comment, Supervisor Liability Under Title VII: A "Feel Good" Judicial
Decision, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 351, 360-61 (1996) (footnotes omitted); cf Lamberson, supra note 63,
at 426-27 (stating that although no legislative history directly deals with the issue of personal
liability, the limited legislative history that is available is clearly contrary to a determination of no
individual liability). For a more extensive discussion of the legislative history of the 1964 Act, see
Montanari, supra, at 360-65. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, see id, at 365-67 (stating that "[t]he 102d Congress, like the 78th Congress, did not leave a
trail of legislative history indicating an intent to incorporate supervisor liability').
87. See Sanborn, supra note 64, at 155.
88. As will be shown below, this stance has regressed to a minority position in the federal
circuits, and this Author believes it is at the point of extinction.
89. See Montanari, supra note 86, at 354.
90. See id.; see also AIC Sec. Investigations,55 F.3d at 1281.
91.

BLACK'S LAw DICTiONARY 1311-12 (6th ed. 1990).
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employers for the wrongful conduct of their employees.92
Although many commentators note the split in the federal circuit
courts with regard to individual liability,93 there is a clear consensus in
the circuits that the employer definition establishes respondeat superior
liability only and that there is no individual liability under the three antidiscrimination statutes.94 This judicial consensus, coupled with the fact
that the D&O insurance policy will only insure a corporation for
indemnification when its directors and officers are found personally
liable, effectively preclude coverage for the corporation under the D&O
policy. As a result, many companies will have to endure the staggering
defense costs and lofty damage awards associated with employment
practices lawsuits without any protection.95

VI. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS' POSITION ON
INDIvIDuAL LIABILITY
There is no longer a great divide among the federal circuit courts
with regard to the issue of individual liability. In fact, a majority of the
circuits have held that there is no individual liability under Title VII, the
ADEA, or the ADA. The following is an analysis of the circuits' position
focusing on the most recent and important court decisions.
A.

The Second, Seventh, and Ninth CircuitsLead the Way

Three circuits, the Second, Seventh and Ninth, have led the way in
holding that there is no basis for individual liability under Title VII, the
ADEA, or the ADA. The Ninth Circuit was one of the first circuits to

92. See Ayvas, supra note 78, at 802.
93. See Greer, supranote 76; Davida H. Isaacs, "It'sNothing Personal"-ButShould It Be?:
FindingAgentLiabilityfor Violations ofthe FederalEmploymentDiscriminationStatutes,22 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 505 (1996); Manna, supranote 78; Ayvas, supranote 78; Dawson, supra
note 79; Lamberson, supra note 63; Lappe, supra note 78; Suzanne G. Lieberman, Note, Current
Issues in Sexual Harassment,50 VASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 423 (1996); Montanari, supra
note 86; Sanborn, supra note 64.
94. See discussion infra Part VI.
95. This point is limited in that states' civil rights laws mirror those of the federal anti-

discrimination statutes. Therefore, a state law claim may be instituted against a director or officer
and individuals may not be precluded from liability under these state statutes. As a result, the
directors and officers insurance policy will respond to these claims. However, since a majority of
these lawsuits are brought under federal law, liability imposed by state statute should not
significantly enhance the limited effectiveness of the D&O liability policy in protecting against
employment practices claims.
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hold that there is no individual liability under these statutes in Miller v.
Maxwell's InternationalInc.96
In Maxwell's International,a former employee brought sex and age
discrimination claims against six defendants in their individual capacities,
as well as against her corporate employer. 7 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals relied on its own precedent in Padway v. Palches,98 which
stated that "individual defendants cannot be held liable for back pay."99
The court then addressed the statutory construction argument and found
that the purpose of the agent provision in the definition of employer was
to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the statute."°s The Ninth
Circuit further reasoned that the statutory scheme of Title VII and the
ADEA evidenced that Congress did not intend to impose individual
liability on employees.'" According to the court, the reason that Title
VII limits liability to employers with fifteen or more employees and the
ADEA limits liability to employers with twenty or more employees was
because "Congress did not want to burden small entities with the costs
associated with litigating discrimination claims."'" The court went on
to say that "[i]f Congress decided to protect small entities with limited
resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to
allow civil liability to run against individual employees."'"
Furthermore, the court stated that because individuals cannot be held
liable for damages under Title VII, a similar result followed under the
ADEA because of the similarities between the statutes.' Finally, the
court rejected the contention that not holding individuals liable will allow
them to violate Title VII with impunity." Conversely, the court
reasoned that the employer has a strong incentive to monitor and control
the actions of its employees."ts

96. 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993).
97. See id at 584. Among the defendants was Donald Schupak who was the chief executive
officer of Maxwell's International, the corporate owner of Maxwell's Plum restaurant, Miller's
employer. See id The other defendants were two general managers of the restaurant and three "lower
level employees." Id.
98. 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982).

99. Id at 968 (citation omitted).
100. See Maxwell's Int'l, 991 F.2d at 587.
101. See id.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 587-88.
See id.
at 588.
See id. "No employer will allow supervisory or other personnel to violate Title VII when

the employer is liable for the Title VII violation. An employer that has incurred civil damages
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The Maxwell's Internationalcourt was not, however, unanimous as
this seminal case on individual liability met with a dissent. In his dissent,
Judge Fletcher rejected the majority's unwillingness to find individual
liability under the federal statutes. 7 He argued that there are strong
similarities between the ADEA and the Fair Labor Standards Act
("TLSA"), and that "[t]here is no question that an individual can be
personally liable as an employer under the FLSA."10 8 Judge Fletcher
argued that the FLSA result should apply to actions brought under the
ADEA.'" The majority addressed this argument by noting that although
it does not
the ADEA incorporates some provisions of the FLSA,
110
specifically incorporate the definition of "employer."
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its holding that there is no personal
liability for employees under Title VII in Greenlaw v. Garrett.! In
Greenlaw, the plaintiff alleged that her former employer, the United
States Department of the Navy, and her former supervisor discriminated
against her on the basis of sex."' The court held that "[u]nder Title VII
there is no personal liability for employees, including supervisors.1 1 3
Finally, a Ninth Circuit district court applied the rationale of
Maxwell's Internationalwith equal force to individual liability under the
ADA."' The court held that because the ADA definition of "employer"
is almost identical to the Title VII definition, and because the Maxwell's
Internationalcourt held there was no individual liability under Title VII,
there should also be no individual liability under the ADA. 5 Thus, it
is clear that in the Ninth Circuit there is no individual liability under all
three federal anti-discrimination statutes.
The Second Circuit adopted a similar position with regard to
individual liability. In Tomka v. Seiler Corp.,"6 the Second Circuit

because one of its employees believes he can violate Title VII with impunity will quickly correct
that employee's erroneous belief." Id
107. See id. at 588-89 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 589.
109. See id.
at 588 n.3.
110. See id.
111. 59 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 1995).
112. See id. at 995.
113. Id. at 1001.
114. See Hardwick v. Curtis Trailers Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Or. 1995).
115. See id.
116. 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995). In Tomka, a female employee initiated a lawsuit against her
former employer and three male co-employees, asserting claims of hostile environment sexual
harassment and retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII and New York's Human Rights Law,
among other causes of action. See i at 1299.
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Court of Appeals decided the issue that divided the district courts in the
circuit over whether
an employer's agent may be held individually liable
7
under Title V]I.
In addressing this issue, the Tomka court established that "an
employer's agent may not be held individually liable under Title
VII.... The court stated that because this was clearly a statutory
construction issue, the obvious starting point was the language of the
statute." 9 It further reasoned that although the plain language of the
statute normally controls, it will not if it is in direct conflict with the
legislative intent of the statute. 2 ° The court believed that Tomka was
one of those cases where the statutory language did not comport
with
2
Congress's clearly expressed intent in enacting the statute.' 1
The Tomka court set forth several reasons to support its conclusion.
First, the fact that the agent clause is part of a sentence that limits
liability to employers with fifteen or more employees was evidence of
Congress's intent to protect small entities from expensive discrimination
litigation." The court also adopted the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Maxwell's Internationaland agreed that it would be inconceivable to
immunize small employers and still impose liability against individual
employees."
Second, the court inferred that, based on Title VII's remedial
provisions, Congress never intended to hold agents individually
liable. " Before the enactment of the 1991 Act, a successful Title VII
plaintiff was limited to reinstatement and backpay, remedies which are
most appropriately awarded by employers." The 1991 Act, however,
added compensatory and punitive damages. The Tomka court believed
that even with the addition of monetary remedies, Congress still did not
intend individual liability. 26 The court inferred that "Congress contemplated that only employer-entities [and not individuals] could be held
liable for compensatory and punitive damages.' 27

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Seeid.at 1313.
Id. at 1317.
See id.at 1313.
See id.
See Id.at 1314.
See id.
See id. "The relevant legislative history of Title VII is consistent with this conclusion." Id.
Seek!.
See id.
See id. at 1315.
Id.
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The Tomka court reached this conclusion based on Congress's
calibration of the maximum allowable damage award according to the
size of the employer and Congress's failure to repeal the exemption for
defendants with less than fifteen employees."2 The court also noted that
the 1991 Act did not cap the damage award against agents of an
employer or even address individual liability."9
The Tomka court reasoned that "the practical implications of agent
liability would create potential inequities that Congress could not have
intended when it enacted the [Civil Rights Act] of 1991."'' A plaintiff
would rarely bring a claim solely against the agent when his or her best
chance of recovering would be against the employing entity." Also,
there are situations where an agent may have to bear an unfair burden of
a Title VII suit,' such as when the entity files for bankruptcy or when
the plaintiff, after reaching a settlement with the corporate defendant,
continues the suit against the agent.' Because the employer's liability
is capped based upon the number of employees,"3 these situations
would lead to the anomalous result that the agent's liability would
depend upon the size of the employer.'

128. See id.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1315-16.
134. See supra note 81.
135. See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1316. As in Maxwell's International,one judge dissented in Tomka.
Judge Parker, who submitted the dissent, focused solely on the issue of individual liability. See id.
at 1318 (Parker J., dissenting). In Tomka, the court also held that individual defendants could be sued
in their personal capacities for sexual harassment under the New York Human Rights Law. See i.
at 1317. This is just to show that successful claims may be brought against individual defendants
(directors or officers) for employment discrimination under state law. This liability may be covered
under a standard D&O policy.
Another important point was addressed in Cook v.Arrowsmith Shelburne,Inc., 69 F.3d 1235
(2d Cir. 1995), where the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a Title VII action against the
individual defendant, relying on their decision in Tomka. See id at 1241 n.2. There the court stated:
The issue of whether such an individual may be made a party defendant solely in the
person's corporate capacity as an agent of the employer-not subject to individual
liability but a party for the purpose of discovery... was neither argued to, nor addressed
by, the Tomka court. we also do not address the issue because it has not been argued in
the instant matter.
Id. (citation omitted). This issue may have a significant impact on whether some D&O policies will
cover employment practices claims. Some insurance carriers (such as National Union Fire Insurance
Company) have a D&O policy that will cover the defense costs of an employment practices liability
claim if the directors and officers are simply named in the lawsuit. Therefore, if it is held that the
individual defendant will remain in the lawsuit in his corporate capacity and will not be dismissed
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Although it is clear that there is no individual liability under the
federal anti-discrimination statutes in the Second Circuit, some district
court cases indicate that it is common for a director or officer to be
named in an employment discrimination lawsuit. In Falbaum v.
Pomerantz,3 6 the individual defendants named were the Chairman of
the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer, a Senior Vice
President, the President, and the General Counsel, who was also a Senior
Vice President."7 The Southern District of New York granted the
defendants' motions to dismiss with respect to their individual liability
under the ADEA.3 The court held that based on Congressional
intent-as inferred from the text, structure, and history of the statute-the
concept of respondeat superior, and the specific definition of "employer,"
Congress intended to hold employers, but not individuals, liable for
discriminatory acts brought under the ADEA 39
After a protracted debate in the district courts, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals finally addressed the issue of individual liability under
the anti-discrimination statutes in EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations,
Ltd." There, the plaintiff sued his employer and its sole shareholder
under the ADA, claiming that he was fired jbecause he had brain and
lung cancer.' 4' The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated simply that
"individuals who do not independently meet the ADA's definition of
'employer' cannot be held liable under the ADA.""4 While the Seventh
Circuit ultimately rejected individual liability, the court had to first
pursuant to a 12(b)(6) motion (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted) these policies may have to pick up the defense costs of the corporation or the directors
and officers.
136. 891 F. Supp. 986 ($.D.N.Y. 1995). In Falbaum, former managerial employees brought an
action against defendants, four current employees, alleging age discrimination under the ADEA and
several state laws. See id. at 987.
137. See id.

138. See id. at 991.
139. See id The Falbaumcourt also held that the bankrupt status of an employer will not lead

to the imposition of personal liability on the agent under the ADEA. See id.
Another related district court case, Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 912 F. Supp. 663 (E.D.N.Y.
1996), aff'd, 110 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997), involved three executive officers. The court granted the

defendants' motions to dismiss because they were not subject to liability under Title VII in their
individual capacities. See id at 668; see also Storr v. Anderson School, 919 F. Supp. 144, 148

(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that supervisors are not individually liable under Title VII or the ADEA);
Altman v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 903 F. Supp. 503, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd,

100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that individuals may not be held personally liable for damages
under the ADA).

140. 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995).
141. See id.
at 1278.
142. Id. at 1279.
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address several arguments favoring liability. In its analysis, the Seventh
Circuit adopted a reasoning similar to that employed by both the Second
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals.
First, the AIC Security Investigations court had to determine the
meaning of the "and any agent" provision of the statute. While the court
recognized the plain meaning argument, it reasoned that the purpose of
the "and any agent" language was to "ensure that courts would impose
respondeat superior liability upon employers for the acts of their
agents."'" The court believed that this conclusion accorded with the
structure of the statutes.'" The court further reasoned that since the
federal statutes limit employer liability to businesses with at least fifteen
or twenty employees, Congress must have intended to protect small
entities from litigating discrimination claims.'45
Additionally, the AIC Security Investigations court noted that the
original remedial provisions under the federal statutes were reinstatement
and backpay and that these remedies were logically provided by the
employing entity, not an individual.'" Like the Second and Ninth
Circuits, the Seventh Circuit believed that this was an indication that
Congress did not contemplate individual liability under the statutes.147
The plaintiffs argued that Congress must have intended for
individual liability when it passed the 1991 Act and allowed compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII and the ADA.' The court,
however, dismissed this argument, noting that the 1991 Act provided
further evidence that Congress did not intend for individual liability.49
The court explained that although it provides for monetary damages,
which are typically obtainable from individuals, the 1991 Act placed caps
on the total amount of compensatory and punitive damages that could be
awarded, with the lowest cap applying to an employer who has fifteen
or more employees. 5 The court inferred that Congress's failure to
enact a cap for individuals implies that it did not contemplate individual
5
liability. '
TheAIC SecurityInvestigationscourt also rejected the argument that

143. Id. at 1281.

144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See supra notes 116-39 and accompanying text.

148.
149.
150.
151.

See AIC Sec. Investigations, 55 F.3d at 1281.
See id
See id.
See id.
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individuals must be punished in order to eradicate discrimination. Rather,
the court believed that the employer had adequate incentive to discipline
and train employees so that these employees will avoid actions that risk
liability. 52 The court noted that even without individual liability, an
employee who owns all or a significant part of the employing entity will
be disciplined by the financial loss he must absorb.'53 Finally, the court
rejected the argument that individual liability must be imposed when an
employer is bankrupt or judgment-proof because it is the only way the
plaintiff may recover." This contention, while it may be true, did55 not
persuade the court to upset the balance that Congress established.
In AIC Security Investigations,the court remarked that although its
holding only applied directly to the ADA, it will affect the resolution of
similar questions under Title VII and the ADEA. 56 It noted that since
the ADA's definition of "employer" mirrors the definition of "employer"
in Title VII and the ADEA, courts routinely apply a similar analysis
regarding individual liability to all three statutes interchangeably. 157 In
fact, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals later applied the ruling in AIC
Security Investigations directly to Title VII in Williams v. Banning.'
In Williams, a secretary sued only her former supervisor under Title
VII for sexual harassment. 159 The court held that the supervisor, in his
individual capacity, did not fall within Title VII's definition of employer. 60 The court reinforced this holding in a more recent Title VII case,
Geier v. Medtronic, Inc.," where the plaintiff brought a suit under
Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. There, the plaintiff sued
her former employer and supervisor after she was dismissed shortly after
informing her supervisor of her second pregnancy while at the company' 62 The court held that the supervisor, in his individual capacity,
operates without the risk of Title VII liability.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals extended its position

152. See id. at 1282.
153. See id. at 1282 n.8,

154. See id. at 1282 n.9.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1282 n.10.

157.
158.
159.
160.

See id. at 1279-80.
72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 553.
See id. at 555.

161.

99 F.3d 238 (7th Cir. 1996).

162. See id. at 240.
163. See Ud. at 244.
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of no individual liability directly to the ADEA in Csoka v. United
States.164 There, the court held that the ADEA, like Title VII, does not
authorize individual liability claims against employees."6
Despite this clear and overwhelming support disfavoring individual

liability, a district court in the Seventh Circuit allowed an individual to
be sued under Title VII under an "alter ego" theory in Curcio v. Chinn

Enterprises,Inc.'" In Curcio, a Title VII action was instituted against
the corporate employer, Chinn Enterprises, Inc., involving, inter alia, the
sexual harassment of four restaurant employees." It happened that Bob
Chinn was the president, controlling shareholder, and head of management with supervisory authority over the restaurant.1 68 The district court

stated that the Seventh Circuit did not expressly address alter ego
liability, 69 but rather indicated that it would be inclined to reject
individual liability under this theory.17 However, the Curcio court
dismissed this statement as pure dicta because the issue was not raised
in the trial court and therefore was not subject to review. 7' Until the
issue of individual liability is fully addressed by the court of appeals, the
district court stated that it would hold that a supervisor may be liable as

an employer under Title VII when a supervisor's role is identical to that
of the employer. 72
164. No. 94-1204, 1996 WL 467654, at *5 (7th Cir. Aug. 12, 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
744 (1997).
165. See id.
166. 887 F. Supp. 190 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
167. See Id. at 191-93.
168. See id.
at 192.
169. See id. at 193. The alter ego theory of liability was premised on a claim that Chinn, as
president, controlling shareholder, and head of management of the restaurant, was identical to the
corporate employer (the Crab House). See id.
170. See id. at 193-94 (citing EEOC v. AIC See. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 n.11
(7th Cir. 1995)).
171. See id. at 194.
172. See id. Until this issue is addressed by the Court ofAppeals, the district court will continue
to follow this rationale which was set forth in Fabiszakv. Will County Boardof Commissioners,No.
94 C 1517, 1994 WL 698509, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 1994). This Author does not believe that
this exception will last very long considering the overwhelming support for no individual liability
in the Seventh Circuit and the Court of Appeals, indication in AIC Security Investigations that it
would be inclined to reject individual liability based on an alter ego theory. A Second Circuit district
court ease, Leykis v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 986, 991 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), also dealt with
this issue.
Several district court cases in the Seventh Circuit disclaim individual liability. See Vakharia
v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp. & Health Care Ctrs., 917 F. Supp. 1282, 1296 (N.D. Ill. 1996);
Whitchurch v. Apache Prods. Co., 916 F. Supp. 809, 812-13 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Ripberger v. Western
Ohio Pizza, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 614, 624-25 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Zor v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 903 F.
Supp. 1226, 1240-41 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp. 274, 277 (N.D. Ill.
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B. A Number of Circuits Follow Suit
After the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals
established the rule of no individual liability under the three federal antidiscrimination statutes, several other circuit courts followed.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of individual
liability in Sheridan v. EI duPont de Nemours & Co."u and held that
an individual employee cannot be sued under Title VII based on the great

weight of authority from other circuit courts."7 In Sheridan, a restaurant employee brought an action against her former employer, E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., and a supervisor, Jacques Amblard,
under Title VII' 75 The issue considered on appeal was whether the

district court erred in dismissing the claim against Amblard on the
ground that Title VII does not impose liability on individual employees.'76 The plaintiff, Sheridan, argued that the "and any agent" language

in the statute permitted her to bring a cause of action against Amblard as
an agent of her employer.'" Sheridan further asserted that since a Title

VII plaintiff may now obtain compensatory damages under the 1991 Act,
it is feasible that an individual defendant such as Amblard may be
required to pay damages.' The court pointed out that these claims

were considered by many other courts in cases under Title VII, as well
as the ADEA and the ADA, all of which define "employer" almost
identically to Title VII,' 79 and a majority of these courts completely

1995); Lynam v. Foot First Podiatry Ctrs., 886 F. Supp. 1443, 1445-48 (N.D. I11.1995).
173. No. 94-7509, 1996 WL 36283, vacated, 74 F.3d 1459 (3d Cir. 1996) (order granting a
rehearing in banc) (affirming dismissal of the claims against the individual defendant, Amblard,
based on the great weight of federal appellate decisions concerning employee liability under Title
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reinforced the Sheridan holding
in two subsequent decisions. In Dici v. Commonwealth ofPennsylvania,91 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 1996),
an employee who had been denied workers' compensation benefits for injuries resulting from alleged
sexual and racial harassment, brought an action against her employer and supervisor under Title VII
and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. See icL at 544. The court concluded that based on the
reasons set forth in Sheridan and other courts of appeals, individual employees cannot be held liable
under Title VII. See id. at 552-53. In a later decision regarding this issue, Kachmar v. SungardData
Systems, Inc., 109 F3d 173 (3d Cir. 1997), the court of appeals acknowledged that, by way of their
Sheridan decision, they joined the majority of other circuits in concluding "'that Congress did not
intend to hold individual employees liable under Title VII."' Id. at 184.
174. See Sheridan, 1996 WL 36283, at *13.
175. See id. at *l.
176. See id. at *12.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id. at *13.
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rejected the concept of individual liability.'
The Third Circuit district courts provided little guidance as to the
circuit's position on individual liability."' Several district court
decisions from the Third Circuit found no employee liability,' while
others held employees liable." In an attempt to reconcile this split, the
court of appeals in Sheridan rejected employee liability under Title VII.
The Sheridan court reasoned that the definition of "employer"
predated the 1991 Act." 4 As reasoned by other courts, the Third Circuit
remarked that prior to the 1991 Act, Title VII did not provide for
compensatory or punitive damages." 5 Rather, it permitted equitable
remedies usually directed against the employer, which included backpay
and injunctive relief."6 The court inferred that since an employee could
not be sued prior to 1991, and Congress did not indicate any desire to
change this rule when it passed the 1991 Act,8 7 the statutory scheme
affirmatively indicated that Congress did not intend for individual
liability under Title VIIV' s The court further reasoned that Congress's
determination of damage caps relative to the size of the defendant was
in anticipation of employer liability. 9
The Fifth Circuit clearly does not permit individual liability under
Title VII and the ADEA. In reaching that conclusion, however, the court
of appeals reversed its position several times. First, in Clanton v. Orleans
Parish School Board,' a group of teachers alleged personal liability
under Title VII.' 9 The court refused to hold the defendant school board
members individually liable for back pay because it could "find no

180. See id.
181. See id. at *13 n.7.
182. See, e.g., Ascolese v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 902 F. Supp. 533, 540-41 (E.D. Pa.
1995); Clark v. Pennsylvania, 885 F. Supp. 694,714 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen
Braverman & Kaskey, 882 F. Supp. 1529, 1531-32 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Verde v. City of Philadelphia,
862 F. Supp. 1329, 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
183. See, e.g., Doe v. William Shapiro, Esquire, P.C., 852 F. Supp. 1246, 1253 (E.D. Pa. 1994);
Dreisbach v. Cummins Diesel Engines, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
184. See Sheridan, 1996 WL 36283, at *13.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. Seeki.
190. 649 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1981). InClanton, the plaintiff challenged the school board's
maternity leave policy as violative of Title VII. See id. at 1086-88.
191. See id.
at 1086.
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authority for holding public officials personally liable for back pay under
Title VII.' 92
Five years later, the Fifth Circuit appeared to take the opposite
position in Hamilton v. VE. Rodgers.' In Hamilton, a fire department
employee brought a Title VII action against the fire department and
various individuals for alleged racial harassment. 94 The court stated
that only employers and agents of employers were subject to liability
under Title VII.' 95 In determining the bounds of agency, the court
asserted that Title VII should be accorded a liberal interpretation in order
to effectuate Congress's purpose of eliminating the inconvenience,
unfairness, and humiliation of ethnic discrimination.'96 The court noted
that if a person participated in the discrimination, that person is an agent
under Title VII. Such a result was necessary to prevent supervisory
personnel from believing that they may violate Title VII with impunity.198
Despite the holding in Hamilton, the Fifth Circuit appeared to
reverse itself again in Harvey v. Blake,' another case involving public
officials. At first, the court of appeals expanded on the Hamilton decision
by stating that "immediate supervisors are [e]mployers when delegated
the employer's traditional rights, such as hiring and firing.""0 However,
the court then stated that "[o]nly when a public official is working in an
official capacity can that official be said to be an 'agent' of the
[employer]" and that "there can be no liability for backpay under Title
VII for the actions of mere co-workers."2 1 The Harvey court held that

192. Id. at 1099 (footnote omitted).
193.

791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986).

194. Seeid. at441.
195. See id. at 442.
196. See id. (citing Rodgers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
197. See id at 442-43 (citing Jones v. Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal Dist. No. 1, 537
F. Supp. 969, 970 (D. Colo. 1982)).

198. See id. at 443.
199. 913 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1990). In Harvey, a city employee brought an action against his
immediate supervisor and her superior in both their individual and official capacities alleging, inter
alia, Title VII violations. See id. at 227.
200. Id.

201. Id. at 228. Official capacity immunity is the rationale some courts have used to bar
individual liability. See Robert Lukens, Comment, Workplace Sexual Harassmentand Individual

Liability, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 303, 352 (1996). It provides government officials with an "absolute
privilege from civil liability should the activity in question fall within the scope of their authority

and if the action undertaken requires the exercise of discretion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1084
(6th ed. 1990). It has a longer tradition but a more limited application than the doctrine ofrespondeat
superior. See Lukens, supra, at 352.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss1/6

28

Cavallaro: Corporate Buyer Beware: Deficiencies in Directors' and Officers'
19971

CORPORATE BUYER BEWARE

the district court improperly denied the defendant's summary judgment
motion for liability in her personal capacity because the suit may proceed
against him in his official, rather than individual, capacity only. 2
In Grant v. Lone Star Co., 03 the court of appeals pointed out that
the Fifth Circuit only addressed the issue of whether a public employee
should be exempt from liability for employment discrimination."'
Grant, on the other hand, involved a sexual harassment suit brought by
a private sector employee under Title VII.20 The court stated that, in
Harvey, it decided that a Title VII plaintiff cannot recover against a
public employee in his individual capacity.0 6 The Grant court reconciled the Hamilton decision, favoring individual liability, by explaining
that the Harvey decision rejected a reading of Hamilton that would
permit personal liability for damages under Title VU.2"7
The Fifth Circuit, persuaded by the Ninth Circuit decision in Miller
v. Maxwell's International Inc.,2 o8 applied the rule of no individual
liability under Title VII to private employers.2 As part of its own
analysis, the Grant court said that "[t]he absence, from the list of
potentially liable parties, of individuals who do not otherwise meet the
requirements of a Title VII employer also suggests that Congress did not
intend to include such natural persons."2 0" This is supported by the fact
that Congress proscribed conduct by "persons"' in other statutory
schemes.2 ' The absence of specific language making individuals liable
under Title VII, when Congress had done so in other statutes, indicated
that Congress did not intend for individual liability unless the individual
fit the statutory definition of "employer."2"2 In conclusion, the Grant
court held that "individuals who do not otherwise qualify as an employer
cannot be held liable for a breach of [T]itle VII.' 21 3
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed individual liability
under the ADEA in Stults v. Conoco, Inc..214 where discharged

202. See id.
203. 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994).
204. See id. at 651.

205. See id. at 650.
206. See id. at 652.
207. See id.
208.

991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993).

209. See Grant,21 F.3d at 652.
210. Id. at 653.

211. Seei.
212. See id.
213. Id.

214. 76 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996).
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employees brought a suit under the ADEA against their former employer
and a supervisor.215 The plaintiffs argued that the agent language
permitted claims against supervisory personnel in their individual
capacities.216 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that the
statutory scheme of the ADEA is virtually identical to the statutory
scheme of Title VI.21 7 Therefore, the court held that the reasoning in
Grant applied with equal force to claims made under the ADEA and
"that the ADEA provides no basis for individual liability for supervisory
employees. 218
The Tenth Circuit experienced a long period of seemingly contradictory opinions on this issue. Finally, in Haynes v. Williams, 2 9 the court
held that personal capacity suits against individual supervisors are
inappropriate under Title VII.' The Haynes court reaffirmed the
Sauers holding as the law of the circuit.
The Haynes court adopted the reasoning set forth in a prior Tenth
Circuit opinion, Sauers v. Salt Lake County."2 In Sauers, a former
secretary with the county attorney's office brought an action against the
county and county attorney alleging sexual harassment and retaliation
under Title VII, as well as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.'
The court of appeals held that suits against individuals under Title VII
must proceed in their official capacity, and any individual capacity suits
were inappropriate. 223 However, the court stated that an individual will

215. See i. at 654.
216. See id, at 655.
217. See id.
218. Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals solidified its position supporting no individual
liability in two other decisions. First, in Garciav. ElfAtochem North America, 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir.
1994), the plaintiff, Garcia, brought a Title VII action against Elf Atochem North America, Jerry
Mowell, and Rayford Locke. See id. at 448. The court began its analysis by stating the Garcia's
complaint was unclear as to whether he was suing Locke or Mowell in their individual capacity or
in their capacity as agents of the employer. The court construed the complaint to be "against Locke
and Mowell in their official capacity since Title VII liability does not attach to individuals acting
in their individual capacity." Id at 451 n.2 (citing Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir.
1994)).
Finally, in a recent Fifth Circuit opinion regarding individual liability, Pattersonv. P.H.P.
Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 767 (1997). The Court of
Appeals noted that although individuals may not be held liable under Title VII, "an individual
employee's actions may subject the employer to liability under agency principles." Id. at 942
(citations omitted).
219. 88 F.3d 898 (10th Cir. 1996).
220. See id. at 901.
221. 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
222. See id. at 1124.
223. See id. at 1125.
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qualify as an employer under Title VII if he or she "exercises significant
control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing or conditions of employment."' 4 Furthermore, the court stated that if the individual is deemed
an employer, it would be solely for purposes of imputing liability to the
true employer. "In such a situation, the individual operates as the alter
ego of the employer, and the employer is liable for the unlawful
employment practices of the individual without regard to whether the
employer knew of the individual's conduct."
Prior to Haynes, however, the court of appeals failed to follow
Sauers with any consistency. Just six months after the Sauers opinion,
in Brownlee v. Lear Siegler Management Services Corp.,,' the court
stated that a "principal's status as an employer can be attributed to its
agent to make the agent statutorily liable for his own age-discriminatory
conduct." 7 This appeared to indicate that personal liability may exist
on the part of an agent."aa
The Tenth Circuit touched upon this issue again in Lanlford v. City
of Hobart 9 and held consistent with Sauers. In Lankford, a former
police dispatcher brought a civil rights action against the city and police
chief."o The court held that since Title VII only applies to an employer,
the Title VII claim against the individual police chief need not be
addressed. 1
However, this decision did not end the conflict within the circuit.
Rather, a year later in Ball v. Renner, 2 the Tenth Circuit concluded

224. Id. (quoting Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989)).
225. Id.
226. 15 F.3d 976 (10th Cir. 1994).
227. Id. at 978.
228. The Brownlee decision relied, in material part, on Owens v. Rush, 636 F.2d 283 (10th Cir.
1980). In Owens, the court of appeals held that the sheriff of Wabaunsee County, Kansas was an
"agent" of the county, and thus, an "employer" of his deputies for Title VII purposes, even though
at 287.
the sheriffs department did not employ fifteen or more employees. See id.
229. 27 F.3d 477 (10th Cir. 1994).
230. See id. at 478.
231. See id. at 480.
232. 54 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1995). In Ball, a former dispatcher brought an action against the
City of Cheyenne, Wyoming and a police officer for sexual harassment under Title VII. See id. at
664. The issue was whether the plaintiff can recover against the police officer individually or was
at 665-66. The Court of
her only potential avenue of relief against the police department. See id.
Appeals stated that courts have interpreted the inclusion of the word "agent" in the Title VII
definition of "employer" in two distinct ways. One interpretation is that the agent provision expands
the category ofpotential defendants under Title VII to include supervisory and management personnel who discriminate in the workplace. See id. at 666. Another possibility is that the language of
§ 2000e(b) merely broadens the circumstances in which "corporations and other organizational employers that otherwise meet the 15-employee threshold and the industry-affecting-commerce
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that Brownlee casts doubt on Sauers and they declined to resolve
the
'' 3
issue of individual liability deeming it to be an "open question. 2
The Haynes decision, however, reconciled these conflicting opinions.
First, the court reasoned that the "[Brownlee] reference to the agent's
potential status as employer need not be read as a deviation from prior
precedent" because it was said as an aside and was not the holding of the
case. 4 The court explained that the Ball decision did not affect Sauers
because the pertinent language in Brownlee, which the Ball court relied
on, was "obiter dictum, while the rule previously recognized in Sauers
(and later followed in Lankford) controlled the court's analysis on the
merits. 'r' Therefore, the Haynes decision eliminated the confusion
generated by these various conflicting decisions and established that there
is no individual liability in the Tenth Circuit.
The law is clearly established in the Eleventh Circuit that individual
capacity suits under Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA are inappropriate.

In addressing this issue, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals consistently precluded individual liability.

In Busby v. City of Orlando,2 6 a discharged black employee of the
Orlando Police Department brought a civil rights action against the city,
requirement may be liable, by ensuring that the discriminatory acts of individuals are imputed to the
employing entity." Id.
According to the first approach, the agency phrase imposes liability not only against the
'employer' in the traditional common-law sense but also downstream against individuals
who are directly responsible for the discriminatory conduct. According to the second, the
phrase serves only to assure that respondeat superior liability operates properly against
the actual employer.
Id.
The Ball court went on to say that courts that impose individual liability "distinguish
between co-workers and supervisors/managers in order to limit liability to those who wield
employer-like authority." Id. at 667. The court stated that this made good sense because the word
"agent' carries the connotation of "someone acting within his or her authority." Id. Furthermore, the
court believed that the respondeat superior interpretation made little sense in analytical terms
because, by definition, "a corporate or other organizational employer can act only through its
agents." Id Therefore, "Section 2000e-2(a), with its prohibition against discrimination by an
'employer' necessarily embodies respondeat superior principles on its own." Id. The court stated that
"[t]here is no need to define an agent of an employer as also being an 'employer' in order to
accomplish what is already built into the substantive prohibition against discrimination." Id.
According to the Ball court, giving the "agent" phrase its literal meaning-that is, making
the responsible agent a statutory "employer" who is liable for discriminatory conduct-"is eminently
sensible as a matter of statutory structure and logical analysis." Id Despite all this, the Ball court
declined to resolve the issue of individual liability. See id. at 668.
233. Id.
234. Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 900 (10th Cir. 1996).
235. Id. (footnote omitted).
236. 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1991).
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mayor, police captain, police lieutenant, and chief of police.1 7 In
stating that individual capacity suits under Title VII are inappropriate, the
court reasoned that the "relief granted under Title VII is against the
employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a
violation of the Act."ns The Busby court further stated that the "proper
method for a plaintiff to recover under Title VII is by suing the
employer, either by naming the supervisory employees as agents of the
employer or by naming the employer directly. ' 9 Consequently, the
court affirmed the district court's directed verdicts in favor of the
defendants in their individual capacities. 2' The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals reaffirmed its position in two recent decisions.
First, in Cross v. Alabama,24 the plaintiffs, past and current female
employees of a state mental health institution, filed Title VII charges
against the state and various state officials 42 After a jury trial, the
district court entered judgment on the Title VII claims against the
defendants in their individual and official capacities.243 The court of
appeals, however, agreed with Horsley's contention that in his individual
capacity he was not an "employer" within the meaning of Title VII.'
The court quoted the holding in Busby and further stated that the "Title
VII claims are properly rendered against the Department ... intheir
official, not individual, capacities."245
The court strengthened its position that individual capacity suits
under Title VII are inappropriate in Welch v. Laney.2' There, the
Eleventh Circuit decided a sexual discrimination claim by a female
employee of a sheriff's department for allegedly being paid less than her
male counterparts. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the individual capacity claim. 47 The Eleventh Circuit
recently extended its reasoning behind Title VII claims to apply to suits

at 770.
237. See id.
238. Id. at 772.
239. Id.
240. See id The Court of Appeals buttressed the Busby holding in Yeldell v. Cooper Green
Hospital, Inc., 956 F.2d 1056 (11th Cir. 1992). The court stated that Title VII actions "may be

brought only against individuals in their official capacity and/or the employing entity." Id. at 1060
(citations omitted).
241. 49 F.3d 1490 (1lth Cir. 1995).
242. See id.at 1494.
243. See i.at 1501,
244. See id.at 1504.

245. Id.
246. 57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995).
247. See i. at 1011-12.
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brought under the ADEA.
In Smith v. Lomax,2' a white female clerk brought an action
against Fulton County, Georgia, as well as against the African-American
members of the Board of County Commissioners.249 Two counts of the
plaintiff's complaint sought relief against Fulton County under the ADEA
and Title VII, and against the defendants in their individual capacities." The court of appeals asserted that Fulton County, not the
individual defendants, was the plaintiff's employer, and therefore, the
individual defendants could not be held liable under Title VII or the
ADEA because the two counts applied only to Fulton County."
Finally, in Mason v. Stallings,.53 the court of appeals precluded
individual liability under the ADA. The court stated that, with regard to
individual liability, there is no sound reason to read the ADA any
differently from their prior reading of Title VII and the ADEA.' The
court concluded that the ADA "does not provide for individual liability,
only for employer liability."255 Therefore, individual liability under Title
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA is precluded as a matter of law in the
Eleventh Circuit.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
individual liability in Gary v. Longe 6 and held that an employee cannot
maintain a Title VII action against his or her supervisor in the
supervisor's individual capacity. 7 In Gary, a female employee alleged
that her employer, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
("WMATA"), and one of its supervisory employees violated Title VII
and committed various common law torts by subjecting her to sexual
harassment."
The plaintiff argued that the plain and unambiguous language of the
"employer" definition could only mean that Long, as an agent of the
WMATA, is subject to liability 9 The D.C. Court of Appeals noted

248. 45 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1995).

249.
250.
251.
252.

See id. at 403.
See id,
See id.
at 403 n.4.
See Id.

253.

82 F.3d 1007 (lth Cir. 1996).

254. See id.
at 1009.
255. Id.

256. 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir.),
cerL denied sub noma.
Gary v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 116 S.Ct. 569 (1995).
257. See id. at 1399.

258. See id. at 1393.
259. See id. at 1399.
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that while it is possible to read the statute as imposing individual liability
on an agent, the better approach is that advocated by the Ninth Circuit,
which concluded that "'[ t]he obvious purpose of this agent provision was
to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the statute."'" 0 Furthermore, the Gary court stated that "while a supervisory employee may be
joined as a party defendant in a Title VII action, that employee must be
viewed as being sued in his capacity as the agent of the employer, who
is alone liable for a violation of Title VII. '
As a result, the court held that although Long's supervisory position
qualified him as an "employer" under Title VII, he could not be held
liable in his personal capacity. Thus, the plaintiff's claim against the
supervisor merged with the claim against the WMATA." 2 Based on
this decision, the law in the D.C. Circuit is clear that individuals are not
liable in their personal capacity under Title VII.
The Fourth Circuit has not completely solidified its position with
regard to the issue of individual liability. While somewhat accepting the
idea of no individual liability under the federal anti-discrimination
statutes, the court of appeals has carved out a considerable exception to
this general rule. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals made an initial
determination regarding individual liability under Title VII in Paroline
v. Unisys Corp.263 and did not address this issue again until the question
of individual liability under the ADEA was raised in Birkbeck v. Marvel
Lighting Corp.' five years later. From Paroline to Birkbeck, the
Fourth Circuit changed its position considerably.
In Paroline, an employee sued her former employer and another
employee alleging sexual harassment under Title VH.26 The court
stated that a plaintiff may pursue a sexual harassment claim against an
individual defendant only if that person is considered an "employer"
within the meaning of Title VII." It held that "[a]n individual qualifies
as an 'employer' under Title VII if he or she serves in a supervisory
position and exercises significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing
or conditions of employment."'67 The court also stated that "[t]he
supervisory employee need not have ultimate authority to hire or fire to

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. (quoting Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993)).
Id.
See id.
879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989).
30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994).
See Paroline,879 F.2d at 102.
See id.
at 104.
Id. (citations omitted).
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qualify as an employer, as2 6long as he or she has significant input into
such personnel decisions.
For example, a company may formally designate an individual as
the plaintiff's supervisor. Despite this, another employee may still wield
supervisory authority over the plaintiff for Title VII purposes. 69 "As
long as the company's management approves or acquiesces in the
employee's exercise of supervisory control over the plaintiff, that
employee will hold 'employer' status for Title VII purposes."27'
The Fourth Circuit's position regarding individual liability was
altered in Birkbeck, where former employees brought an action against
their employer and the employer's vice president for violating the
ADEA.27' The court noted that the few courts that have found individual liability under the ADEA have reasoned that employees with the
authority to make discharge decisions for their employers are individually
liable as their employer's agents. 2 Accordingly, the court rejected this
approach reading the provision of the ADEA defining employer as
restricted to those who employ twenty or more workers.2"
The court, not wanting to disregard legislative intent, reasoned that
Congress defined "employer" as such to protect small businesses from
the burden of discrimination lawsuits.274 The court also believed that

the "agent" language was merely an expression of respondeat superior
which means that "discriminatory personnel actions taken by an
employer's agent may create liability for the employer."275
The court of appeals, however, failed to provide individuals with
complete protection from liability. In a footnote, the court stated that an
employee "may not be shielded as an employer's agent in all circum'
stances."276
The court further asserted that it was only addressing
"personnel decisions of a plainly delegable character."' As a result,
the court held that the ADEA limits civil liability to the employer, and
that the vice president, in his individual capacity, was not a proper

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. (citation omitted).
See id.
Id.
See Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 509 (4th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 510.
See id.
See id.

275. Id.

276. Id. at 510 nl.
277. Id.
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defendant in the case."
District court decisions, interpreting the court of appeals decisions,
add clarity to the somewhat inconsistent position by the Fourth Circuit
on the issue of individual liability. For example, in Mitchell v. RJK of
Gloucester, Inc.,279 the district court stated that it was compelled to
follow the holding in Birkbeck, and that the reasoning in Birkbeck should
apply with equal force to Title VII claims.28 The Mitchell court stated
that applying the Birkbeck rationale to Title VII is not a major leap
considering that the definitions in both statutes are virtually identical and
that they were designed with the same purpose-to prevent discrimination in the workplace.2!
In applying Birkbeck, the Mitchell court had to first deal with
Paroline,the controlling Title VII case within the Fourth Circuit. The
court conceded that while it supported the Birkbeck decision of no
individual liability, this did not mean that an individual would never
qualify as an "employer" under Title VII.2 2 The court noted that the
Paroline court interpreted the definition of employer as including
individuals who "'serve[- in a supervisory position and exercise[
significant control over ... hiring, firing, or conditions of employment."' 23 However, the court pointed out that Birkbeck narrowed the
Parolineruling.'
Although the Birkbeck court held that individuals were not liable
under the ADEA, it did not shield individuals in all circumstances;
rather, it shielded individuals only in instances involving .'personnel
decisions of a plainly delegable character."'" 5 The Birkbeck court did
not attempt to clarify what it meant in that brief footnote. s6 However,
the Mitchell court interpreted the restrictive language in Birkbeck to mean
that decisions that any employee in a supervisory position might make
such as hiring or firing may be delegated within the corporation and thus
shield an individual from liability under the employment discrimination
laws."8 7 This court believed that Birkbeck implies that sexual harass-

278. See id. at 510-11.

279. 899 F. Supp. 246 (E.D. Va. 1995).
280. See id. at 247-48.
281.

See id. at 248.

282.
283.
284.
285.

See id.
Id. (quoting Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989)).
See id.
Id. (quoting Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994)).

286. See id.at 248 nA.

287. See id.
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ment is not "plainly delegable" and thus individual liability can apply in
such cases. 28
289
In another district court case, Stephens v. Kay Management Co.,
an employee brought an action against a former employer and a former
supervisor under the ADA.2 The district court applied the Birkbeck
reasoning that individuals are not liable under the ADEA to ADA
claims.29' The Birkbeck court, however, limited its holding to only
personnel decisions of a plainly delegable character.2" The Stephens
court opined that while it was unfortunate that the Birkbeck court did not
define the meaning or scope of that language, 293 the fact that Birkbeck
addressed termination of employment established at least that those types
of decisions were of a "plainly delegable character."29 The court went
on to note that "[a]fter Birkbeck, there is no personal liability under
either the ADEA or Title VII for individuals making a decision to
terminate employment. 295
Thus, the court held "that individuals who do not independently
meet the ADA's definition of 'employer' cannot be held liable under the
ADA in the making of employment decisions of a plainly delegable
'
character."296
However, "individual supervisors remain individually
liable for personnel actions which are not of a plainly delegable
' The court also noted that it is doubtful that Birkbeck extends
nature."297
to sexual harassment claims because Parolineinvolved sexual harassment
and it seemed that Birkbeck placed the situation in Parolinebeyond the
reach of its holding because it did not involve a personnel decision of a
plainly delegable character.298 The court did not attempt to set the
parameters of "plainly delegable" personnel decisions.29
In conclusion, the general rule in the Fourth Circuit appears to be
that there is no individual liability under Title VII, the ADEA, and the
ADA. However, there remains this elusive "plainly delegable" language
which, until it is more concretely defined by the court of appeals, will
288. See id.
289. 907 F. Supp. 169 (ED. Va. 1995).

290. See idt at 170-71.
291. See id.at 172.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

See iad at 173.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 173-74.
Id at 174.
Id

298. See id.
299. See id.at 174-75.
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give district courts some latitude in imposing liability on individuals,
especially with respect to Title VII sexual harassment claims.
C. The First Circuit Still Perchedon the Fence
The First Circuit is yet to make a determination on the issue of
individual liability. It is apparent, however, through district court
decisions, that the trend is toward following the rule of no individual
liability for discriminatory acts under Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA.
While the First Circuit Court of Appeals has not ruled on the
issue," ° two district courts have followed the trend that individuals are
not subject to liability under the federal anti-discrimination statutes.
Initially, the District Court of Maine was adverse to this position. In
Braverman v. Penobscot Shoe Co.,01 the court held that a supervisory
employee was subject to suit under both the ADEA and the ADA.0 2 In
a subsequent decision, the same court found that "shielding workplace
supervisors who discriminate from personal liability fails to further the
expansive remedial goal of Title VII. 30 3
The District Court of Maine, however, recently changed its position
in light of the recent developments in other circuits and held in Quiron
v. L.N. iolette Co.3" that an individual supervisor is not personally
liable under the ADA or ADEA." 5 The Quiron court noted that the
ADEA limits the scope of its applicability to businesses with twenty or
more employees, and the ADA, like Title VII, only applies to employers
with fifteen or more employees.3" The court reasoned that these limits
indicate the desire on the part of Congress not to burden small entities
with the costs associated with litigating discrimination claims." 7 The
court then extended this reasoning and noted that Congress would not
impose liability on individuals in larger companies because those

300. In fact, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has explicitly declined to resolve the issue of
individual liability in two recent cases. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 992-93 (lst Cir.
1997) (stating that the First Circuit has not resolved the issue and declining to "enter this thicket"
in the case at bar); Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 444 (1st Cir. 1997)
(declining to answer the question whether a corporate supervisor may be individually liable under

Title VII).
301.

859 F. Supp. 596 (D. Me. 1994).

302. See id. at 602.
303. Weeks v. Maine, 871 F. Supp. 515, 517 (D. Me. 1994).
304. 897 F. Supp. 18 (D. Me. 1995).

305. See id. at 20.
306. See id.
307. See id. (quoting Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LA WRE VIE W

[Vol. 26:217

individuals would bear similar litigation burdens."' The court concluded that the ADA and the ADEA included agents in their definition of
employers, not to make agents individually liable, but, to ensure
respondeat superior liability."° In the end, the District Court of Maine
held that0individuals are not subject to suit under either the ADA or the
31
ADEA.
The District Court of New Hampshire also addressed the change in
the legal landscape concerning individual liability under the federal antidiscrimination statutes. In Miller v. CBC Companies, Inc., 1 the court
noted that there was considerable change since Lamirande v. Resolution
Trust Corp.,s" 2 where the court stated that the circuits were in general
agreement that an agent of an employer was subject to individual liability
under Title VII based on the plain language of the statute.3 1 3 The CBC
court noted that numerous circuits have now rejected individual liability,
believing that Congress included the agent wording simply to impose
respondeat superior liability on employers." 4 Given the virtual consensus among circuit courts that have addressed this issue, the District Court
of New Hampshire was persuaded to change its position.315 Although
the First Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed the issue of
individual liability, these district court decisions reflect a trend or
common consensus not to hold individuals personally liable under the
anti-discrimination statutes. Recent determinations within the Sixth and
Eight Circuit Courts of Appeals have resolved the issue of individual

liability.
D.

CircuitsRecently Coming off the Fence

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals squarely considered the issue of
whether individual agents may be personally liable under Title VII for
discriminatory acts committed on the job in Wathen v. General Electric
Co." 6 In Wathen, an employee filed suit against her employer and three

308. See id.
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. 908 F. Supp. 1054 (D.N.H. 1995).
312. 834 F. Supp. 526 (D.N.H. 1993).
313. See id. at 529.
314. See CBC Cos., 908 F. Supp at 1065.
315. See id. As a result, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the ADA claim
against them in their individual capacities. See id.
316. 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997). Prior to the Wathen decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals did not squarely address the issue of individual liability. In fact, the court missed the
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management employees in their official and individual capacities,
alleging sexual harassment under Title VII and the Kentucky Civil Rights

Act, as well as other state law claims." 7 In addressing the issue of
individual liability, the court of appeals held that an individual employ-

ee/supervisor, who does not otherwise qualify as an employer, may not
be held personally liable under Title VIV 8
The court of appeals arrived at this conclusion based on several
factors. First, the court was persuaded by the majority of circuit courts
that have held that there is no individual liability under Title VII and
similar statutory schemes. 9 Second, the court asserted that the "and
any agent" provision in Title VII did not establish individual liability
because a narrow and literal reading of a statute will not control if it will
produce a result clearly at odds with the express intent of Congress. 2
In this regard, the court was convinced that Congress did not intend to
provide for individual employee/supervisor liability under Title VII based
on Title VII's statutory scheme and remedial provisions. 2
The court stated that the statutory scheme of Title VII was a clear

indication that Congress did not intend to impose individual liability on
employees 3 Because Title VII limits liability to employers with
fifteen or more employees, the court believed that 'Congress did not
want to burden small entities with the costs associated with litigating

opportunity in Wilson v. Nutt, 69 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 1995). However, the court of appeals alluded
to this issue in four different opinions, which have been subsequently used by plaintiffs in
discrimination suits to support their contention that individuals may be liable under Title VI.
However, these remarks supporting liability have been construed as no more than obiter dicta, failing
to establish a binding precedent on the circuit supporting individual liability. See Yates v. Avco
Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987) (having no persuasive effect on the issue of individual liability
because the issue was simply not addressed); Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th
Cir. 1986) (stating that the "law is clear that individuals may be held liable for violations of § 1981
... and as agents of an employer under Title VII," but this statement has been regarded as dictum
and not the central point of the case); Romain v. Kurek, 772 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1985) (implying that
an individual could be liable in his or her personal capacity, although more than one district court
did not believe that this case supported the proposition that individual liability is allowed under Title
VII); York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that an
agent could be sued in his official capacity as a representative of the employer if the principal entity
fit within Title VII's "employer" definition).
317. See Wathen, 115 F.3d at 403.
318. See id. at 405. The court of appeals relied on case law under Title VII, the ADEA, and the
ADA in reaching this holding because the three statutes define "employer" in essentially the same
manner. See id at 404.
319. See id.
at 404.
320. See id.at 405.
321. See id.
322. See id.
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discrimination claims.""'3u Further, the court of appeals agreed with the
Second Circuit's conclusion that it is 'inconceivable' that a Congress
concerned with protecting small employers would simultaneously allow
'
civil liability to run against individual employees."324
The court of
appeals also noted, consistent with the Second Circuit, that no mention
was made of agent liability in the floor debates over section 2000e(b),
thereby "'implying that Congress did not contemplate agent liability
under Title VII.' 325
The court asserted that Title VII's remedial provisions also indicates
that liability should not be imposed on individual employees for
violations of the Act.3" In noting that prior to the 1991 amendment, a
successful Title VII plaintiff was limited to remedies available only from
an employer such as reinstatement and backpay, the court believed that
this limitation on the available remedies suggested that Congress did not
intend to allow recoveries against individual employees under Title
VII.327 Although compensatory and punitive damages for intentional
discrimination under Title VII were added as potential remedies as a
result of the 1991 amendment, the court of appeals pointed out that
Congress calibrated the amount of compensatory and punitive damages
recoverable to the size of the employer, beginning with employers having
at least fifteen employees."2 Finally, the court believed that since the
statute contained no provision for damages to be paid by individuals,
Congress did not intend to hold individuals liable. 29
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, although touching upon this
issue in a few cases, has also not definitively addressed whether
individual supervisors may be personally liable under Title VII.33 In

323. Id. at 406 (quoting Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993)).
324. Id. (quoting Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995)).

325. Id.
326. See id.
327. See id.

328. See id.
329. See id.
330. It seems as though the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, although in a cursory manner, has
resolved the issue of individual liability under the federal anti-discrimination statutes. See Spencer
v. Ripley County State Bank, 123 F.3d 690, 691 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming summarily the district

court's holding that the president of a bank could not be held personally liable for harassing a teller
based on the reasons stated by the district court); Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly
Community Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that Spencer established the law
of the circuit after squarely holding that supervisors may not be held individually liable under Title

VII).
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1988, in Hall v. Gus Construction Co.,33 ' the Eighth Circuit affirmed
a Title VII decision against a construction company and one of its
foremen individually.332 However, the issue of liability of a supervisor
as an agent was neither appealed nor directly addressed in the decision.
Furthermore, although the court of appeals stated that the supervisor and
the construction company were liable, it is not clear what the court meant
by liability when, prior to 1991, Title VII remedies were of a nature
generally not applicable to individual supervisors.3 33 In actuality, the
Hall decision is too ambiguous to provide any real guidance.
The court of appeals again skirted around the question of individual
liability six years later in Smith v. St. Bernards Regional Medical
Center.334 The court dismissed claims of race discrimination against
co-workers, concluding that "the claims against individual defendants
were properly dismissed because liability under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) can
attach only to employers. 3 1 Thus, the court was not asked to decide
the question of whether supervisory employees, or agents of the
employer, fell within the definition of "employer" under Title VII.
However, defendants sometimes cite the Smith case for the proposition
that individual employees cannot be held liable under Title VII because
they are not employers. Once again, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
failed to take a clear stance on the issue of individual liability.
Still in need of a clear and concise ruling on the question of
individual liability, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals made statements
that may be indicative of their eventual position in Lenhardt v. Basic
Institute of Technology, Inc.,336 even though the issue was not before
them. In Lenhardt, the question was whether an individual defendant,
who was the sole shareholder, sole director, and president of the
corporate employer, could also be considered an "employer"
within the
337
meaning of the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA").
The court introduced the issue by noting that Title VII, the ADEA,
and the MHRA are "similar statutory schemes that prohibit discrimination in employment against protected classes., 338 Furthermore, the court
found that the federal statutes include definitions of "employer" that are

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988).
See id. at 1017.
See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
19 F.3d 1254 (8th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1255.
55 F.3d 377 (8th Cir. 1995).
See id.
at 378.
Id. at 380.
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analogous to the MHRA's definition of the term.339 The Lenhardt court
reviewed numerous federal decisions in all the circuits involving Title
VII and the ADEA and found compelling that the "more recent cases
reflect a clear consensus on the issue before us: supervisors and other
employees cannot be held liable under Title VII in their individual
capacities."
In light of all this, the court could only hold that the
definition of the term employer in the MHRA does not subject employees, including supervisors or managers, to individual liability.34'
A survey of the Eighth Circuit district courts reveal one lone case,
Schallehn v. Central Trust and Savings Bank, 2 which stands for the
proposition that a supervisory employee can be held individually liable
under the ADEA 43 However, the overwhelming majority opinion in
the circuit is that supervisors may not be held individually liable as
employers under Title VII. Absent any directive from the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, a majority of these district courts adopted the
reasoning and conclusions -of the Ninth Circuit as set forth in the
Maxwell's Internationaldecision. Since these decisions are not binding,
and the court of appeals has reserved its opinion as to the question of
individual liability, the issue remains unsettled in the Eighth Circuit.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Based on the current state of the federal case law, it is evident that
the overwhelming position taken in the federal circuit courts is that
corporations, and not individuals, are subject to liability under Title VII,
the ADEA, and the ADA. Therefore, companies that have purchased a
standard D&O policy, even with the EPLI endorsement, hoping to insure
themselves against liability in an employment discrimination lawsuit
should be alarmed. A majority of these employment practices lawsuits,

339. See id.
340. Id. at 381.
341. See a
342. 877 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
343. See id.
at 1331.
344. See Griswold v. New Madrid County Group Practice, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D. Mo.
1996); Boyland v. General Novelty, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Ark. 1995); Carter v. Lutheran
Med. Ctr., 879 F. Supp. 94 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Grissom v. Waterloo Indus., Inc., 902 F. Supp. 867
(E.D. Ark. 1995); United States ex rel. Lamar v. Burke, 894 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mo. 1995);
Accordino v. Langman Constr., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 237 (S.D. Iowa 1994); Engle v. Barton County
Mem'l Hosp., 864 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Mo. 1994); Williams v. Rothman Furniture Stores, Inc., 862
F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Mo. 1994); Henry v. E.G. & G Missouri Metals Shaping Co. Inc., 837 F. Supp.
312 (E.D. Mo. 1993); Stafford v. State, 835 F. Supp. 1136 (W.D. Mo. 1993).
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as demonstrated, are brought against the corporation as well as against
the individuals involved in the discriminatory conduct. The D&O policy
does not cover corporate liability in and of itself, and based on the
federal circuit court decisions, the individual directors, officers, or
employees named in the lawsuit will be precluded from personal liability.
Therefore, the corporation will not be reimbursed for any litigation
expense incurred because it did not have to indemnify the directors or
officers for any personal liability. As a result, the D&O policy will
afford, at most, minimal protection to businesses faced with employment
practices litigation.
Furthermore, companies should beware when acquiring an EPLI
endorsement to their D&O policy because, like the standard D&O policy,
it may be deficient in protecting against employment practices liability.
The EPLI endorsement, although insuring the directors, officers, and all
of the employees (in some cases), does not extend coverage to the
corporate entity for employment practices claims.345 Companies purchasing this extension will be in the same position they were in prior to
purchasing the policy. The claims against any individual engaged in
wrongful discrimination will be dismissed, 3 " and complete liability will
rest with the corporate employer. As a result, the EPLI endorsement will
have no practical value. 47
Companies, however, may seek shelter against employment practices
liability by purchasing a relatively new insurance policy known as
EPLI.3" EPLI is the 'Trst insurance product specifically intended by
insurers to provide coverage for employment-related perils such as
discharge from employment, workplace discrimination, and sexual
' 4 It specifically covers the corporation as well as its
harassment."M
directors, officers, and employees. In fact, EPLI coverage is now widely
available from some major insurance companies.35
Although companies have the option to purchase the stand-alone

345. See Cavallaro, supra note 7, at 39; Machson & Monteleone, supra note 33, at 712.
346. These claims against individuals in their personal capacity will be dismissed if they are
brought under Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA. However, individual liability is permitted under
some related state laws. Notwithstanding, based on the previous analysis of individual liability in
the circuit courts, it does not matter in which circuit the claim is brought.
347. See Machson & Monteleone, supra note 33, at 712.
348. See id. at 711; Monteleone, supranote 30, at 47; Gilbert, supra note 32, at 9; Zolna, supra
note 32, at 40.
349. Monteleone, supra note 30, at 47.
350. Such companies include Reliance, Zurich/American, AIG, and Shand Morahan & Co. See
Zolna, supra note 32, at 41.
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EPLI policy, which does extend coverage to the corporate entity, they
may neglect to do so based on the false sense of security derived from
possessing a D&O policy, with or without the EPLI endorsement, and
their reluctance to pay premiums for two separate policies that they
believe provide the same coverage. This is simply an unwise business
practice, and this Author urges corporate employers to reconsider their
options when seeking protection against employment discrimination suits.
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